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for the judgment by some distinct and independent kind of logical activity. It would have greatly simplified the discussion, and would surely be truer to experience, to begin with a cognitive consciousness that has from the first the form of a judgment. It would then have been possible to bring the various forms and stages of thinking more clearly into relation as modifications of a single function.

J. E. C.

Kants Ethik: Einführung in ihre Hauptprobleme und Beiträge zu deren Lösung. Von AUGUST MESSER. Leipzig, Veit & Comp., 1904. — pp. xii, 606.

This book of Professor Messer's is designed as an introduction to the complete study of Kant's moral philosophy, and it must be confessed that, both so far as matter and manner are concerned, it more than adequately fulfils its purpose. There is a complete historical presentation of the development of Kant's views on the nature of the moral and social world from the days of the influence over him of the views of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson and Hume and Rousseau, and his attempt to combine these views with those of the Wolffian philosophy, to the days of the beginnings and the culmination of the critical period, and also a presentation of the development of Kant's views on the subject of human freedom. A serviceable analysis is also given of Kant's chief ethical writings, and a comparison made between the *Metaphysic of Morals* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*. The chief problems that arise out of Kant's ethical philosophy are also considered in the light of the special literature upon the subject that has appeared in Germany, and a long, careful chapter is devoted to the discussion of Kant's theory of the *Summum Bonum* and the 'Postulates' of the Practical Reason. And the volume concludes with chapters upon the relation of leading ethical tendencies of the present time to the teaching of Kant.

Seeing that the chief feature of the book is thus the presentation of ethical material from Kant himself, it is not necessary to present an outline of this in a mere report like the present. The result of the whole is to show the superficiality of some of the merely partial or dialectical interpretations of Kant's moral philosophy, and also the extent to which one may be, — with Dr. Messer himself, — in substantial agreement with Kant as to the main facts of the moral consciousness of mankind. So far as the charge of rigorism or asceticism is concerned, it is not, Professor Messer shows, the existence and operation of the inclinations and the feelings that are to be overcome according to Kant, but only their undue influence in the matter of our knowledge of moral distinctions. Another important feature of the book is the careful examination and presentation of the grounds and sources of Kant's ideas as to the Postulates of the Practical Reason. This leads Dr. Messer to the result that we cannot remain faithful to the fundamental ideas of Kant's ethics and accept his theory of the highest good and the

doctrine of the postulates that is founded upon it, — a conclusion that makes the reader wish that the book had been made even more useful by the addition of a chapter or two on the relation of Kant's ethical teaching to his philosophy as a whole, and on the question whether the two can be very well kept apart. Some such careful presentation of the development of Kant's views on the pure and the practical uses of the reason as is given of his views on freedom would have been most valuable, and would, perhaps, have set in an even clearer light the substantial independence (of both philosophy and science) that accrues to ethical science from Kant's treatment. And then again the relation of Kant's ethics to other leading tendencies might, perhaps, have taken more cognizance of the views of thinkers other than German. Still, as I have already indicated, Dr. Messer has given us an indispensable book so far as Kant's ethics is concerned and the important German literature upon that subject; and this is saying a very great deal indeed.

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Kants Revolutionsprinzip (Kopernikanisches Prinzip). Eine exakte Lösung des Kant-Humeschen Erkenntnisproblems, insbesondere des Problems der 'Erscheinung' und des 'Ding-an-sich.' Von ERNST MARKUS. Herford, Verlag von W. Menckhoff, 1902.—pp. vii, 181.

This work represents an attempt to show that, within the limits which Kant himself fixed for his Critical Philosophy, it possesses the character of exact science and is capable of proof no less convincing than that which the mathematician or physicist offers for his own principles. The scientific character claimed for Kant's philosophy depends upon the fact that his doctrine consists essentially of *a priori* propositions which are of the nature of postulates and axioms. The author openly declares himself at war with the interpretation of writers like Paulsen and Vaihinger, who maintain that Kant's teaching contains manifest contradictions, and that metaphysics as an exact science is impossible. He even declares that, were he convinced of the truth of their view, he would cease to attach any value to Kant's work and to metaphysics generally.

The title of the monograph, *Revolutionsprinzip*, is based upon the familiar statement in the preface to the second edition of the *Critique* that we should try the assumption that objects must conform to the nature of the mind. The earlier part of the work is devoted to an attempt to establish the absolute validity of the *a priori* factors in knowledge.

Under a principle which the author calls "the dynamic identity of reality," he seeks to give concrete expression to Kant's idea of objective unity. The principle means that the objective validity of the categories is the necessary presupposition of the objective unity of nature, and hence is the presupposition of all experience. The categories are native to, or inherent in the self, in the sense that they rest upon an 'elementary log-